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— he short-term GDP growth-based economic success of the BRICS has spawned a trend of 
grouping large emerging market economies under shared monikers. he proliferation of a 
wide array of labels—from MINTs to VISTAs—within political and inancial circles has been 
accompanied by a growing scholarly interest in the study of these ‘emerging markets’ and 
future ‘rising powers’. his paper discusses the literature on Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status to 
problematise the conceptual and analytical parameters that shape the debates on ‘emerging 
markets’ and ‘rising powers’. Accordingly, I argue that the established parameters are wholly 
based in, and in turn, reproduce, a neoliberal conception of development which prioritises a 
narrowly construed metric of economic progress based on GDP growth while simultaneous-
ly ignoring the associated socio-economic and environmental costs. he paper interrogates 
the ways in which select macroeconomic indicators have been deployed to legitimise neolib-
eral reform in Turkey and utilises this case study to mount a methodological challenge to the 
relevant IR/IPE literatures that conceptualise ‘emerging markets’ and ‘rising powers’ from 
growth-oriented perspectives. 
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Antinomies of Growth
One considerable side effect of the global economic crisis of 2007–8 has been the popularisation of 
a perceived decline in advanced Western powers’ ability to maintain economic growth and project 
their political and economic power at the international level. Although the main neoliberal princi-
ples which sustain the Western economic model have not seen a drastic rejection or reconigura-
tion (Centeno and Cohen 2012, Peck, heodore and Brenner 2012: 266), analyses of Western ‘de-
cline’ have been accompanied by a simultaneous growth of interest in the economic and political 
performance of the so-called ‘rising powers’.  As the contributions to this special issue demonstrate, 1
there are good reasons for this. As the UNDP highlighted in its 2013 Human Development Report, 
‘[f]or the irst time in 150 years, the combined output of the developing world’s three leading 
economies – Brazil, China and India – is about equal to the combined gross domestic product 
(GDP) of the long-standing industrial powers of the North – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom and the United States’ (UNDP 2013: 12–13). Brazil, China and India, along with 
Russia and South Africa, officially adopted the ‘BRIC[S]’ acronym coined by the Goldman Sachs 
economist Jim O’Neill (2001) and institutionalised their previously ad-hoc partnership through the 
initiation of the New Development Bank, an extensive contingency reserve arrangement as well as 
regular summit meetings. Grouping of large emerging market economies based on real GDP 
growth igures has since become a trend with the proliferation of a wide array of labels, including 
MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey), MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey), 
CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa), EAGLES (emerging and 
growth-leading economies), VISTA (Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Argentina) and 
MAVINS (Mexico, Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa). O’Neill and his Goldman 
Sachs colleagues later revisited their own BRICs moniker and developed a new grouping called 
N-11 (Next Eleven) countries (O’Neill et al. 2005).  hese categories, as Claudio Katz has highlight2 -
ed, are ‘based on short-term inancial considerations’ (Katz 2015: 76), but rather than merely sig-
nalling investment opportunities and equity fund groupings, they have taken on a life of their own. 
Simultaneously, the ‘rising power’ label which had become synonymous with the BRICS has been 
extended to include some of the countries that we ind in these new emerging market groups. 
 A cursory look at these emerging market groupings reveals a common denominator: Turkey 
igures in almost all of them. Indeed, the performance of the Turkish economy under the supervi-
sion of the Justice and Development Party governments (hereater, AKP) between, in particular, 
2003–2016 has triggered a long list of laudatory academic and media analyses that placed Turkey as 
an emergent ‘rising power’ (inter alia, vom Hau, Scott and Hulme 2012, Burns 2012, de Aenlle 
2013, Fontaine and Kliman 2013, Phylaktis 2014). As one (skeptical) IR scholar recently put, ‘the 
claim that Turkey is a rising power now seems to be widely accepted and mostly 
uncontroversial’ (Bagdonas 2015: 310). In response to this seemingly staggering economic success, 
Turkey has been hailed as ‘a shining (and rare) example in the Muslim world of a vibrant democra-
cy with the rule of law and a thriving free-market economy’ (he Economist 2010a, Sachs 2013). It 
has been variously described as a ‘pivotal regional power’ (Ilgıt and Özkeçeçi-Taner 2014: 184); a 
‘regional hegemon’ (or a candidate to become one) (Triantaphyllou and Fotiou 2010: 60, Öniş 2003, 
Erickson 2004), ‘a rising power in a difficult region’ (Erişen and Kubicek 2016: 1), ‘a rising power in 
Africa’ (Özkan 2013: 140) and ‘an inspiration’ to the Arab states in the atermath of the Arab upris-
ings (Keyman and Gümüşçü 2014: 91). Sympathetic observers even started discussing whether 
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‘Turkey [is] big enough to attract the attention of the BRICS’ and become an official BRICS mem-
ber in the future (Bacık 2013: 765).  3
 What explains this seemingly universal appreciation of Turkey’s economic programme and its 
potential ‘rising power’ status? Although some scholars highlighted AKP’s new ‘rhythmic diploma-
cy’ and foreign policy as an indication of Turkey’s growing ambitions, the main criterion of those 
who perceived Turkey in the aforementioned terms was its economic performance. Indeed, Tur-
key’s post-2002 economic growth has been consistently cited as a sign of its ‘rising power’ status. 
Despite the long-standing criticism of GDP as an adequate measurement of economic progress,  4
the proponents of this argument have treated GDP-based growth igures as indisputable metrics of 
economic progress and cited macroeconomic indicators to reinforce the claim that Turkey was in 
the process of achieving a ‘rising power’ status. 
 he paper problematises the conceptual and analytical frameworks with which the debates on 
Turkey’s economic and political trajectory have been shaped. Accordingly, I argue that the estab-
lished parameters are wholly based in, and in turn, reproduce a neoliberal conception of develop-
ment which prioritises a narrowly construed metric of economic progress based on GDP growth 
while simultaneously ignoring the socio-economic and environmental costs that the accompanying 
processes of labour market reform/lexibilisation, public sector restructuring and rapid inancialisa-
tion have entailed.  As with similar discussions of ‘emerging economies’ and ‘rising powers’, Turkey 5
has been ‘discursively situated in relation to perceived endpoints and outcomes that are theoretical-
ly expected to accrue from the “correct” implementation of capitalist transitions’ (Smith 2002: 666). 
Accordingly, the attempts to depict Turkey as another candidate for the epithet of a ‘rising power’ 
have reproduced a problematic emphasis on economic growth for growth’s sake and pre-empted a 
critical interrogation of successive AKP governments’ key growth-oriented policies. 
 he present interrogation contributes to the special issue in two principal ways. While the spe-
cial issue zooms in on the BRICS’ engagement with and impact on global economic governance, 
the paper speaks to a number of ontological and methodological concerns that have deined the 
academic and popular debates on ‘rising powers’. As highlighted by Bishop and Murray-Evans in 
their introduction, attempts to analyse the limits and prospects of ‘rising powers’ groupings in the 
global economy have been shaped by several shortcomings, which include the tendencies to ‘equate 
power and inluence with material capabilities’ (see also, Murray-Evans in this issue), and to down-
play ‘the speciicities of rising power political economies and domestic institutions’. he irst contri-
bution of this paper is to re-examine the indicators utilised in the measurement of ‘material capa-
bilities’. his exercise is not designed to recapitulate the well-known weaknesses of certain macro-
economic indicators, but to lesh out more concretely how their deployment by policy-makers and 
academics can serve speciic functions, and further certain domestic and international interests. 
 Second, and related to the irst issue, the paper addresses the ‘domestic gap’ highlighted by the 
editors by reviewing the debates on Turkey’s so-called bid to become the next ‘rising power’, which 
most intensely took place between 2007/8–2016. I retrace how macroeconomic indicators have 
been valorised in the debate on Turkey’s once-promising ‘rising power’ status and examine the so-
cial ramiications of authoritarian neoliberalism—the institutional setting under which this seem-
ingly positive account of economic growth has emerged. I am not interested in refuting or disprov-
ing the empirical validity of the arguments for Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status—which, as I will show 
below, can also normalise the precepts of neoliberal development. Rather, my aim in this paper is to 
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unearth the issues that the ‘rising powers’ debate has invisibilised and downplayed. More speciical-
ly, taking a leaf out of Brett Christophers’ work on inance, the paper seeks to engage with the de-
bate not by ‘looking for a “better” or “truer” representation’ of Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status, but by 
challenging the parameters on which the very claims have been grounded (Christophers 2011: 
114). I consider this endeavour more important than simply refuting the empirical validity of the 
markers that are identiied as ‘rising power’ indicators, as these markers themselves—such as GDP 
growth rate, FDI inlows and a nebulous emphasis on pursuing a ‘proactive’ foreign policy—have 
been prioritised in ways that silence the discussion of a host of deleterious processes that have facil-
itated the performance of those indicators in the irst place. 
 As such, the task of the paper is to illuminate the socio-economic ramiications of the parame-
ters that scholars have valorised as the indicators of a Turkish bid for regional/global power. he 
paper thus aims to render visible what has been made invisible by the existing discussions of Tur-
key’s ‘rising power’ status, with the clear implication that a similar line of critique can (and ought 
to) be extended to the examinations of the BRICS’ role in and impact on global economic gover-
nance. While the special issue editors insightfully suggest the importance of ‘[revealing] the con-
crete means and processes through which both rising and established powers are shaping global 
governance’, my paper stands as a reminder that such efforts still need to carefully engage with de-
velopments that are oten coded as ‘domestic’ (read: less consequential for the global economy). 
 I will undertake this task in two movements. First, I will dissect how Turkey’s ‘rising power’ 
indicators have been legitimised and valorised in academic discussions. Second, I will explore how 
the processes that scholars attribute to Turkey’s ‘rise’ have materialised concomitantly with a host of 
negative socio-economic developments. I will focus, in particular, on how the excessive attention 
given to select macroeconomic indicators prioritised by the ‘rising powers’ debate masks the pat-
terns of (un)employment, inequality, household indebtedness and negative environmental impact 
that have accompanied Turkey’s economic growth. 
What is at stake in deining a ‘rising power’? 
Before unpacking how and why a considerable academic literature on Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status 
has emerged in the past few years, it is imperative to briely revisit the conceptual and analytical 
questions that surround the ongoing debates around the BRICS and other ‘emerging’ country 
groups. 
 Despite a considerable degree of difference in their respective development trajectories, political 
regimes and geopolitical objectives, ‘BRICS’ has become a self-fulilling prophecy by taking on a 
more or less active institutional form since 2009. Yet, in contrast to the institutional manifestation 
of the cooperation between these countries, the concept of ‘BRICS’ and its more encompassing, yet 
equally nebulous relative (see Hart and Jones 2010: 64–68), ‘rising powers’ are both very much un-
dertheorised to the extent that one could argue that ‘BRICS’ only makes sense as a political–institu-
tional arrangement, rather than a concept that could foreshadow new development paradigms—
and, perhaps, even a world order in transformation. As such, I echo Matthew Bishop’s (2016: 5) 
insistence on perceiving not only ‘BRICS’, but also the epithet of ‘rising powers’ as ‘a descriptive 
device, rather than an analytical one’. his is particularly the case because, besides the heavily em-
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phasised marker of ‘economic growth’, both the academic and popular representations of these 
countries as a coherent ‘bloc’ fail to explain the shared socio-economic processes and accompany-
ing policies that have ostensibly catapulted them onto the heights of the global economy. ‘BRICS’, 
thus should be deined not as the harbinger or the successful application of a common development 
strategy, but as a politically malleable category marked by the absence of a ‘core dynamic driving the 
rapid development of these ive countries, and (…) a central shared agenda or ideology’ (Bishop 
2016: 6, see also Fourcade 2013). 
 he corollary of this formulation is the recognition that the term ‘rising powers’, precisely be-
cause of the ambiguity of its contents, could be deployed to legitimise certain policies, exaggerate 
their positive impact, or to prioritise a set of indicators in shaping policy objectives at the expense 
of other relevant markers—all in the name of achieving a ‘rising power’ status. he term, thus, is a 
politically convenient and expedient framing device for privileging growth-oriented policies and 
narrowing the terms of economic and political decision-making, contestation and debate. More-
over, as I will demonstrate, the concept’s pretension to capturing an empirically veriiable transfor-
mation—oten justiied by growth igures—has been highly seductive for social scientists interested 
in charting domestic trajectories of socio-economic and political change, as well as realignments in 
international regimes. For those who have focused on Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status, the promise of 
the concept, unfortunately, has prevented them from critically interrogating the very parameters 
with which they tracked Turkey’s ‘rise’. he result has been the proliferation of analyses that neither 
account for the cost of seeking rapid growth as a short-term development strategy, nor systemati-
cally challenge the neoliberal orientation of government policy. 
 A brief detour is necessary at this juncture to clarify what exactly I mean by a ‘neoliberal orien-
tation’. Even though some segments of the critical literature on the BRICS have explained these 
countries’ role and objectives in the global economy as that of ‘re-legitimising neoliberalism’ (Bond 
2013: 252, Prashad 2013, cf. Desai 2013, Mittelman 2016), I do not wish to associate the concept of 
‘rising powers’ strictly with a reductive regionalism that serves merely to reproduce neoliberalism. 
On the contrary, there are good reasons to avoid the portrayal of BRICS exclusively as a neoliberal 
counteroffensive given the spectrum of growth strategies followed by the designated emerging 
countries. In their path to achieve greater integration into the world economy, Brazil, India and 
China ‘developed quite speciic variants of neoliberalised political economies’ (Schmalz and Ebenau 
2012: 490). For some scholars, the most drastic cases of transition, namely China and Russia, have 
been underpinned by policies that comfortably deviated from the established precepts of neoliberal 
reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As opposed to a clearly demarcated transition to market 
economy in strict compliance with the Washington Consensus, Chinese and Russian reforms can-
nibalised and repackaged existing institutions and state practices to chart out speciic strategies that 
prioritised local/national concerns.  In Brazil, the intense political contestation and social struggles 6
around economic issues have engendered a ‘hybrid’ regime that combines ‘elements of neoliberal-
ism and Latin American neodevelopmentalism’ (Boito and Saad-Filho 2016: 194). Other contribu-
tions to this special issue highlight the distinctive growth models and domestic political economies 
of a range of rising powers (see, in particular, Bishop and Zhang, Muzaka and Serrano, Lesage et 
al.). 
 he post-2002 Turkish case might also be construed along the lines of ‘non-neoliberal’ or ‘hy-
brid’ development, or at least as a type of development programme that did not duly follow the 
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instructions of the major IFIs. For example, ‘the expansion and reorganization of social assistance 
and (…) the strengthening of the role of the state in the housing market’ has led some observers to 
note that the AKP period could not be exclusively deined by ‘neoliberal orthodoxy’ (Dorlach 2017: 
55). Others went even further to underscore the ‘non-neoliberal’ accomplishments of Turkey by 
arguing that the ‘rising power of Turkey as a new breed of the semi-periphery has not and need not 
(…) adhere [sic] to the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal policies that have been advised’ (Moore and Dan-
nreuther 2009: 155). However, these representations could only be deemed accurate in teasing out 
Turkey’s ‘non-neoliberal’ orientation if neoliberalism is understood strictly as a mode of gover-
nance that eliminates state supervision over the economy and privileges ‘the market’ and market 
actors in managing economic activity. 
 his limited understanding of neoliberalism as an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ drive for market fundamental-
ism crucially misses out the key role states and (authoritarian) state power have played in adopting, 
protecting and reproducing policies that we attribute to ‘neoliberalism’. Tied to a particular ‘origin 
story’ that is ‘grounded in the social experience of the global North’ (Connell and Dados 2014: 118), 
the free market-oriented conception of neoliberalism undermines an appreciation of how crisis-
stricken states—both in the global North and South—have found in neoliberalism a short-term 
panacea to relieve immediate economic and political tensions generated by the crisis tendencies of 
capitalist accumulation. From this perspective, every (re)appearance of the state within a neoliberal 
context suggests an anomaly or a departure from the textbook neoliberal prescriptions as formulat-
ed by a narrowly chosen set of experts and economists. 
 Yet as I will demonstrate below, even the most ‘interventionist’ state policies do not necessarily 
signal a withdrawal from a broader neoliberal orientation as long as these are deployed to revitalise 
the circuits of capital accumulation without providing compensatory initiatives that also secure the 
conditions of state-sanctioned welfare—in other words, the types of social provisions we would 
expect to see in welfare states or developmentalist programmes. Such a reorientation and distanc-
ing from the free market-oriented conception of neoliberalism necessitates an appreciation of ne-
oliberalism as a strategy to offset the crises of capital accumulation (see Tansel 2017 for an extended 
discussion). he corollary of this reorientation vis-à-vis the ‘rising powers’ debate is to question 
why the parameters that valorise capital accumulation (e.g., GDP growth) have been selected as the 
appropriate lenses with which to assess the country’s performance (not only economically, but also 
socially and politically). Unpacking these parameters essentially requires an investigation into what 
kind of ‘progress’ the observers have chosen to prioritise, and perhaps more importantly, what kind 
of ‘development’ should critical political economy scholarship aspire to promote? 
How was Turkey deined as a ‘rising power’? 
It is important to note at the outset that Turkey’s portrayal as a ‘rising power’ did not emerge in a 
single political or professional ield, but was nurtured by a combination of actors, including AKP 
governments, local and international media and, inally—and most importantly for our purposes—
academics located in a cross-disciplinary spectrum which spanned the IR, IPE, comparative poli-
tics and area studies literatures. 
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 From 2002 to 2012/3, the Justice and Development Party enjoyed a highly favourable reception 
in mainstream international press and was oten portrayed as a dynamic agent of economic and 
political reform.  Encapsulating this trend, he Economist’s special report on Turkey in 2010 boast7 -
ed that the country had transformed its once ‘sclerotic and erratic’ economy in less than a decade 
and credited AKP governments as the architects of this seemingly unprecedented transformation 
(he Economist 2010b). Repeated references to Turkey’s stable growth rates, rising living standards 
and an EU-oriented democratic reform agenda elevated the international perception of the country 
as an exemplary democracy in the Middle East that could serve as a ‘model’ for other Muslim-ma-
jority countries.  In the run up to the 2011 general elections, Reuters described Turkey precisely 8
along these lines, as a ‘rising power with a vibrant, free economy and a U.S. ally that aspires to join 
the European Union’, as well as ‘an example of marrying Islam and democracy and (…) an oasis of 
stability in a region convulsed by “Arab Spring” uprisings’ (Cameron-Moore and Villelabeitia 2011). 
 Analyses, commentaries and reports published to this effect in the irst decade of AKP’s reign 
can be listed ad ininitum, yet of note here is the convergence between the party’s portrayal in the 
most respected corners of the international media and the government’s own account of its objec-
tives and achievements. Echoing the popular references to the country’s economic success under its 
supervision, AKP too framed its own legitimacy and its propriety as the party best capable of serv-
ing the country’s interests from a particularly economistic perspective. he party’s own emphasis, 
with a clear intent on appealing to both domestic and international audiences, remained predomi-
nantly on a narrative of rapid economic growth, which was contrasted with the years of crisis that 
had preceded its ascent to power in 2002. In 2010, the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
crystallised this position as follows: 
Besides its cultural, historic and diplomatic values, Turkey’s vibrant economy has become a source of 
stability and welfare. When my party took office in 2002, the Turkish economy totaled around $250 bil-
lion. Today, Turkey’s annual GDP has reached $800 billion, making it Europe’s sixth largest economy and 
the 17th largest in the world. It has also been one of the least impacted by the global economic crisis, 
with growing foreign trade, a strong banking system and diverse and prospering small and medium-size 
enterprises. hus, the Turkish economy returned to its pre-crisis levels in 2010. (Erdoğan 2010) 
he ot-quoted yet erroneous claim that Turkey’s GDP had ‘tripled’ during the irst ten years of 
AKP rule became a signature headline that manifested not only in government rhetoric but also in 
widespread reports and analyses, and the government continued to amplify Turkey’s role as a ‘ris-
ing’ power by emphasising the ‘central role’ it purportedly played in ‘promoting international secu-
rity and prosperity’ (Davutoğlu 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011, Sabah 2015). 
 Given the political expediency and legitimacy it offered to the government, it is not surprising 
to see that AKP has fully embraced this growth-oriented economic success story and that the high-
ranking party officials themselves have repeatedly represented Turkey as a ‘rising power’. Likewise, 
the popular commentaries and reports which reinforced this positive portrayal during the party’s 
irst decade in power can also be contextualised as predictable lapses in light of the international 
media’s problematic relationship with reporting the Middle East and many reporters’ reliance on 
and uncritical adoption of a limited range of indicators such as GDP growth (see Harb 2017). It is, 
however, surprising that many social scientists and experts on Turkish politics and political econo-
my have too adopted the terms of the ‘rising powers’ debate and tried to make sense of Turkey’s 
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trajectory under AKP rule by deploying a heavily undertheorised term that obscures more than it 
reveals. 
 Reviewing the ‘rising powers’ literature on Turkey provides us with a clear set of markers and 
indicators that scholars have been utilising to assess Turkey’s status. he key category deployed in 
these analyses, as mentioned before, is Turkey’s economic growth, which is deined—sometimes 
inconsistently—in terms of changes in annual GDP. Accompanying the emphasis on growth is eco-
nomic stability, which is understood as a necessary condition for attracting foreign investment but 
also functions as a symbolic category to evaluate the degree to which government reforms have 
been ‘successful’. Finally, there is oten an implicitly coded hierarchy vis-à-vis Turkey’s place within 
the Middle East, whereby the perceived improvements in Turkey’s economic and democratic per-
formance are seen as developments that serve to rank the country as a more important actor than 
the other states in the region. hese three markers are frequently discussed in parallel with more 
‘political’ concerns regarding Turkey’s geopolitical activism and the ebbs and lows in its institu-
tional and democratic practices. 
 One of the most comprehensive academic efforts to tackle the question of Turkey’s ‘rising pow-
er’ status, the special issue of Turkish Studies edited by Tarık Oğuzlu and Emel Parlar Dal—later 
published as an edited volume (Kubicek, Parlar Dal and Oğuzlu 2016)—fully embodies the prob-
lematic parameters of the debate as outlined above. Despite the centrality of the concept of ‘rising 
powers’ to this emergent research strand, it is troubling that neither the editors nor the contributors 
provide any serious interrogation of the term itself.  On the contrary, Turkey’s ‘rising’ status is taken 9
for granted and deployed as an explanan rather than an explanandum. his is a particularly striking 
omission given how, in the same issue, Şaban Kardaş (2013: 639) chastises the ‘regional powers’ 
literature for taking Turkey’s ‘regional power’ status ‘for granted’ and merely ‘embark[ing] on a de-
scriptive analysis of Turkey’s behavior in different regions.’ Yet, amidst a stream of assertions about 
Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status,  the collection reproduces the same error by not questioning why, in 10
the irst place, a political and academic conversation about Turkey’s ‘rising power’-ness has 
emerged, how the debate has been framed, and which conceptual and analytical parameters have 
been deployed to analyse this seemingly novel coniguration of power.  11
 On the contrary, efforts to make sense of Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status seem to fall back on con-
ventional categories inherited from a particular strand of International Relations theory and the 
editors themselves largely frame the debate around the question of whether BRICS pose a threat to 
the existing liberal international order. One of the consistent threads that connect these analyses is 
the signiicance of ‘hard power’ indicators, which are broadly discussed as ‘material 
capabilities’ (Oğuzlu and Parlar Dal 2013: 629, Kardaş 2013: 642, cf. Bishop and Murray-Evans in 
this issue). Drawing from the regional powers literature, Kardaş cites GDP as a key material capa-
bility along with population and military power. here are also (less tangible) references to Turkey’s 
‘visionary foreign policy and new geopolitical discourse’ (Oğuzlu and Parlar Dal 2013: 619) as sig-
nals of its growing ambition to be a ‘rising power’. 
 Yet it is the category of economic growth that takes the driving seat in the contributors’ efforts to 
assess Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status. Oğuzlu and Parlar Dal (2013: 618) emphasise that Turkey’s 
‘rise’ has been ‘characterized by the country’s high economic growth’, while Soner Çağaptay (2013: 
800) argues that Turkey’s economic growth under AKP’s leadership has been ‘[u]nprecedented’ and 
that it played the key role in ‘[undergirding] Turkey’s rising international proile’. Çağaptay repro-
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duces the above-discussed government rhetoric by repeating the claim that ‘Turkey’s economic 
output has nearly tripled’ since 2002 and further asserts that ‘the government’s ability to foster sta-
ble political conditions for economic growth’ has been the trigger of the country’s ‘rise’ (Çağaptay 
2013: 800, 807 emphasis added). he major role attributed to this ‘unprecedented’ growth perfor-
mance is echoed in other contributions elsewhere. In their call for taking Brazil, India, Indonesia 
and Turkey seriously as ‘global swing states’, Richard Fontaine and Daniel M. Kliman (2013: 101) 
cite Turkey’s ‘rapid economic growth’ as the factor that enabled the country to ‘carve out [for itself] 
a new international role’—an argument that inds resonance in a compatible analysis by Federico 
Donelli and Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi (2016: 99) who highlight the importance of ‘political consoli-
dation, as well as economic growth’. 
 Elsewhere, in a discussion of the aforementioned ‘Turkish model’, Gönül Tol (2012: 352) under-
scores how ‘[t]he success of Turkey’s democratic experiment and its economic model of high pro-
ductivity and export-led growth have contributed to the country’s rising image in a region where 
authoritarian regimes and rentier economies dominate’. his is a curious portrayal, not only be-
cause the trajectory of Turkish politics since the publication of this article has led to serious inter-
rogations of the party itself as an authoritarian actor (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016), but also be-
cause the author’s emphasis on ‘high productivity’ and ‘export-led growth’ is not accompanied by 
any substantial exploration of the conditions in which these ‘achievements’ were reached (more on 
this below). On the contrary, economic growth is invoked, once again, as an incontestable econom-
ic fact that automatically denotes progress, thus not requiring further analysis or an examination of 
the ways in which it is conceptualised and calculated. Furthermore, Tol’s analysis epitomises the 
tendency to elevate Turkey in a hierarchy of Middle Eastern states and positions Turkey’s neoliberal 
model as the endorsed economic programme, which is then juxtaposed against ostensibly weaker 
‘rentier economies’ in the region. 
 his overlap between the attempts to assess Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status and its ‘model’ quali-
ties as a geopolitical–economic blueprint for other Middle Eastern states presents us a inal avenue 
in which to tease out which conceptual and analytical parameters are valorised by the protagonists 
of the debate. While the contributions to the ‘rising powers’ debate justify their claims about Tur-
key’s upward trajectory by citing its economic performance, there is surprisingly little analysis of 
the policies that AKP’s economic model has advanced or the concrete ramiications of these poli-
cies.  In the absence of such analyses of how the economic growth rates were achieved in the irst 12
place, the contributors to this debate prima facie identify economic growth as the product of an 
efficient and successful economic programme. Economic growth functions as a proxy to affirm the 
success of reforms advanced—yet not always initiated—by AKP, but it also clearly demarcates the 
existing government policy as ‘best practice’ (cf. Sheppard and Leitner 2010). 
 here is, therefore, a normative dimension that underpins this constant signposting of growth 
igures as a benchmark of Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status. hese ‘quantitative truth claims’ (Tooze 
2008: 683) not only aim to conjure an empirical reality based on veriiable—yet still open to misin-
terpretation as in the case of ‘tripling’ GDP—data, but they also appoint the broader economic pro-
gramme from which this picture emerged as the correct way to implement economic reforms. Ex-
amples to this effect manifest most visibly in the efforts to contextualise Turkey’s ‘success’ vis-à-vis 
the other Middle Eastern economies, the conditions of which are—as signalled above—oten de-
scribed in negative terms. Fuat Keyman and Şebnem Gümüşçü (2014: 91) illustrate this trend in 
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their claims that in the post-‘Arab Spring’ landscape of the region, ‘many Arab states have come to 
regard Turkey’s impressive growth rate and the improvements in its citizens’ economic well-being 
under the AKP’s neoliberal economic policy as a source of awe and inspiration’. he party’s ‘neolib-
eral economic policy’ here takes the credit for providing improved ‘economic well-being’ to Turkish 
citizens and is positioned as the key pillar of an emergent ‘Turkish model’. Keyman and Gümüşçü 
(2014: 165) go on to establish the centrality of neoliberalism, not only in the country’s economic 
performance but also in AKP’s electoral victories by underscoring that ‘the party’s successful pur-
suit of its neoliberal economic agenda combined with the instrument of proactive foreign policy 
[…] conveyed to the Turkish society that the AKP was its best option in charting the troubled wa-
ters of globalization’. In the growth-oriented positioning of Turkey as a ‘rising power’, neoliberalism 
thus becomes a success story, a model to be emulated by the other states in the region as well as 
low-/middle-income countries across the globe (cf. Tansel 2015: 576–80). 
 What are the implications of this widespread prioritisation of economic growth as a yardstick 
with which to evaluate the country’s economic performance since 2002? Which processes, ruptures 
and continuities are silenced by the way in which the ‘rising powers’ debate is framed? he article 
now turns to an examination of how Turkey’s ‘unprecedented’ growth has materialised. 
What was rendered invisible in the making of the ‘rising power’ Turkey? 
As the debate around Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status predominantly emerged on a narrative of un-
precedented economic success, it is crucial at this juncture to offer a balance sheet of AKP govern-
ments’ economic performance. he following brief retrospective account will focus on a number of 
key issues that the ‘rising powers’ debate has almost exclusively overlooked. Yet, before I focus on 
the social ramiications of successive AKP governments’ rapid-growth-oriented economic strategy, 
I will briely revisit the ‘unprecedented’ growth claims, not to fetishise further the signiicance of 
GDP growth as an indicator of progress, but to reveal how the attempts to read growth as a proxy 
for development are constructed on dubious premises, even if we accept the existing parameters of 
the ‘rising powers’ debate without any objections—namely by focusing strictly on macroeconomic 
indicators without interrogating the indicators themselves. 
 Since the participants of this debate almost universally invoked GDP growth as an objective 
conirmation of economic development, and thus a determinant of Turkey’s ‘rising power’ candida-
cy, it makes sense to compare Turkey’s record with other ‘emerging’ countries that are included in 
various ‘rising powers’ indices. To illustrate the convergence between the official government 
rhetoric and the academic prioritisation of GDP growth I have outlined so far, I will review the 
claims sketched out in a Rising Powers Quarterly article by Ömer Çelik, a former AKP MP and the 
current Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator, as well as a political scientist by training. Re-
peating the economic success narrative of the government, Çelik makes two symptomatic claims. 
hese are (1) ‘[t]he growth rate in Turkey has outperformed emerging economies in recent years’, 
and (2) Turkey’s growth rates are ‘comparable only to the growth rates of BRICS countries’ (2016: 
41–42, emphasis added). Çelik’s claim that ‘Turkey’s GDP has increased from 230 billion USD in 
2002 to 721 billion USD in 2015’ (2016: 42) replicates the erroneous ‘tripled’ GDP account. GDP 
growth looks less impressive when we use the more conventional and accurate category of real 
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GDP growth measured in constant local currency (as opposed to nominal GDP in current US$ 
which Çelik prefers). Growth in nominal GDP indicates a tripling from roughly $232 billion in 
2002 to $717 billion in 2015. However, at constant prices measured in Turkish Liras (TL), GDP in 
2015 represents less than a two-fold increase in comparison to the 2002 igure (from TL 72.52 bil-
lion in 2002 to TL 131 billion in 2015).  13
 Çelik’s other claim—that Turkish GDP growth is ‘comparable only to the growth rates of BRICS 
countries’—is even more problematic. As shown in Figure 1, the average real GDP growth of Tur-
key in the 2002–2015 period was easily overtaken by many other ‘emerging economies’ like Nigeria, 
Vietnam, Bangladesh and Indonesia. When the same comparison is made between a larger sample 
of countries, Turkey’s GDP growth in real terms is higher than Russia, South Africa and Brazil; but 
it is, by no means, comparable to China and India—or to Qatar and Peru purely based on GDP 
igures (Figure 2).  A more meaningful comparison based on real GDP growth would necessitate 14
drawing in the Philippines, Malaysia or Colombia to the discussion, which, as far as my review sug-
gests, has not been undertaken systematically in the contributions to the ‘rising powers’ debate. 
<< Figures 1 and 2 >> 
 Given the claims about the increased ‘economic well-being’ (Keyman and Gümüşçü 2014: 91) of 
Turkey’s citizens in the same period, does disaggregating growth igures justify the positive por-
trayal of the Turkish economy? References to a ‘tripling’ of GDP per capita are also rife in the de-
bate,  however, when measured in real terms, GDP per capita has increased by 50 per cent (from 15
TL 1,113 in 2002 to TL 1,668 in 2015), not ≈200 per cent as the ‘tripling’ narrative suggests. More-
over, when average GDP per capita growth in the 2002–2015 period is contrasted with the same 
sample of N-11 and FTSE countries, the emergent picture suggests that the improvements are not 
exceptional, but are roughly in line with similar developments recorded in other ‘emerging coun-
tries’ like the Philippines and Malaysia (see Figures 3 and 4).  16
<< Figures 3 and 4 >> 
 Let me state clearly once again that the point of this brief exercise is not simply to reveal a more 
‘accurate’ picture of the Turkish economy by using the same, inherently problematic category of 
growth and its equally problematic GDP-based calculations. However, this overview demonstrates 
that the intentional or unintentional misrepresentation of the available data not only by the gov-
ernment, but also by political economists and social scientists in general, should give us serious 
pause before we hasten to evaluate Turkey’s economic and/or geopolitical ambitions as a ‘rising 
power’. Moreover, these distortions should be seen as the by-products of a very particular under-
standing of what the economy, development and progress mean, and what role the state can (and 
should) play in managing them. 
 What is missing in the ‘rising powers’ debate on Turkey is a curiosity to explore what kind of 
effects the improvements in these indicators have engendered in the everyday life of Turkey’s citi-
zens. In other words, there is a need to explore the ramiications of what are automatically assumed 
as positive developments due to veriiable improvements in macroeconomic indicators. In the inal 
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part of the paper I will provide a series of snapshots into the key areas of the economy that AKP’s 
growth-oriented policies have transformed since 2002 and underscore their centrality to any seri-
ous debate on measuring the country’s economic and political trajectory. 
 Favourably cited privatisation igures provide a useful starting point to disentangle the threads 
between AKP’s neoliberalism and its impact on households. Oten envisioned purely as an invest-
ment source, the record number of proceeds accrued from the government’s privatisation drive has 
had a signiicant impact on the country’s overall FDI balance (Macovei 2009: 14). Yet the govern-
ment’s privatisation programme has not merely functioned as a revenue generating policy, it has 
been a crucial part of a broader realignment of the state’s role in the economy and the way in which 
the state supervises labour and industrial relations. According to the Prime Ministry Privatisation 
Administration’s own reports, the aims of the privatisation programme include (1) ‘reducing the 
role of the public sector in the economy’, (2) ‘redeining the areas of the economy in which the pub-
lic sector will be active by withdrawing the state from production and letting it focus on its main 
functions’ (though these ‘main functions’ remain unstated), (3) ‘creating a conducive environment 
to promote and support private sector activities’ (ÖİB 2017: 46). 
 While the roots of Turkey’s substantial efforts at privatising state enterprises date back to the 
1980s (Sönmez 2011), AKP governments have radically intensiied the scope of privatisation. In the 
seventeen years from 1986 to 2003, the state’s total privatisation implementation amounted to a 
relatively unimpressive igure of $8.24 billion (ÖİB 2017: 60).  From 2004 to 2013, proceeds from 17
the government’s revamped privatisation programme rose signiicantly to $35.255 billion, with 
2013 marking the highest annual proceed at $12.486 billion (See Figure 5). Four major sales consti-
tuted the lion’s share in this monumental reconiguration of state ownership as the privatisation of 
Türk Telekom (the former telecommunications monopoly), TÜPRAŞ (Turkey’s largest industrial 
company), and two large conglomerates ERDEMİR and PETKİM amounted to a total $15.5 billion 
(Angın and Bedirhanoğlu 2013: 76). 
<< Figure 5 >> 
 To contextualise these igures, it is useful to note that the OECD’s privatisation report in 2009 
ranked Turkey ith in its ‘privatisation Top 10’ (covering annual implementations from 2000 to 
2007) and estimated that the country’s privatisation proceeds were greater than that of the United 
Kingdom, Australia and the Netherlands (OECD 2009: 7). he magnitude of the sales becomes 
more apparent when we zoom in on the individual cases. For example, the World Bank’s Privatisa-
tion Database registered Türk Telekom’s $6.550 billion sale as the eleventh largest transaction that 
took place between 1990 and 2008 in developing economies, and unlike the top ten transactions—
which were dominated by Russian and Chinese IPOs and public offerings (including Rosnet and 
Bank of China)—Türk Telekom’s privatisation was a block sale.  While this ampliied privatisation 18
programme should not be read as a sign of an absolute weakening of the state’s active role in the 
economy, it is important to note that ‘the state withdrew entirely from some sectors such as cement, 
dairy production, forest productions and petroleum distribution, while more than 50 per cent of its 




 he deepening of the privatisation programme has had signiicant consequences for the condi-
tions of employment and the environment. he government’s push to extend privatisation was 
quickly conjoined by coeval attempts to deregulate environmental protections—the most concern-
ing result of which is the rapid proliferation of Hydroelectric Power Plants (HEPPs) that pose sig-
niicant risk to soil, air and water quality (Berkun 2010, Hommes, Boelens and Maat 2016). Ap-
proximately 70 per cent of completed or ongoing HEPP projects by 2013 ‘were exempt from envi-
ronmental impact reports’ (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014: 82). Likewise, the amended law on mining 
investments resulted in the approval of 9,132 new permits in 2005 (up from 2,625 in 2004) for ‘ex-
ploration and extraction in forests, around sources of water and in other previously protected 
zones’ (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014: 83). he corollary of these expanding spheres of privatisation has 
been (1) a steady transformation and weakening of the regulatory and administrative bodies re-
sponsible for environmental protection, particularly with regards to urban planning (Doğan and 
Stupar 2017), and (2) an increase in the scope and intensity of concentrated state violence against 
communities and trade unions resisting privatisation plans, displayed most nakedly in the case of 
Yatağan thermal plant’s contested privatisation (Yörük 2014, Hürriyet Daily News 2014) and the 
privatised tobacco monopoly TEKEL workers’ 78-day long occupation in Ankara (Özuğurlu 2011, 
Tait 2010). 
 he nexus of privatisation and environmental exploitation has been enhanced in the service of a 
‘growth’ strategy. Further state-led attempts to create a Turkish ‘energy hub’ with the infusion of 
private capital have sparked social mobilisations in areas designated for the construction of new 
coal-ired power plants such as Zonguldak (Cardoso and Turhan 2018: 404). As Erensü (2018: 154) 
notes: 
By deregulating environmental directives such as the Environmental Impact Assessment procedures 
iteen times, rejecting to ratify the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, effectively using the 
mechanisms of consent and bribery as well as violence to suppress local resistances, abusing and stretch-
ing land expropriation procedures to meet the land needs of private companies, and leaving rural devel-
opment to the will of extractive industries, AKP effectively transformed the countryside by putting rural 
livelihoods and land at the service of the extraction/infrastructure industry. 
 It is essential to underline that the envisioned beneits of increased FDI inlows and privatisa-
tion did not materialise in employment. On the contrary, the Turkish economy’s seemingly rapid 
rise in the last decade can best be described as an instance of ‘jobless growth’ whereby the ‘rapid 
surges in GDP and exports’ did not translate into any signiicant changes in unemployment pat-
terns (Yeldan and Ercan 2011: 10). Under AKP rule, the rate of total unemployment remained 
steady around 10 per cent, the employment to population ratio remained at a lower level than the 
1990s and youth unemployment saw only a slight decrease from 19.2 per cent in 2002 to 18.9 per 
cent in 2016 (Figure 6, Bozkurt-Güngen 2018: 226). Total unemployment rate lagged signiicantly 
behind the average of other upper middle income countries (including the BRICS minus India). 
<< Figure 6 >> 
 A closer look at employment patterns reveals a drastic decrease in agricultural jobs and a con-
siderable increase in service sector employment. Employment in agriculture decreased from 34.9 
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per cent in 2002 to 20.4 per cent in 2015, while service sector employment rose to 52.4 per cent in 
2015 from 42.1 per cent in 2002.  While the contraction of the overall agricultural employment 19
might partly be understood as an atereffect of the food price luctuations in the world market, the 
government’s agriculture policy, which aggravated deteriorating conditions by removing state sub-
sidies, is a crucial component in the light from agriculture (Sönmez 2011: 112). 
 he growth-oriented policies have fallen short of generating substantial new employment op-
portunities for the country’s sizeable unemployed and informally employed population, yet the 
conditions of the existing workforce did not see signiicant improvements either. On the contrary, 
the government has pursued a labour policy of what Aziz Çelik (2015) has termed ‘authoritarian 
lexibilisation’, which involves drastically limiting the rights and mobilisation capacity of trade 
unions, curtailing pre-existing employment rights, and promoting lexible and precarious forms of 
employment. Successive changes to the employment laws have resulted in the exclusion of ‘more 
than half ’ of all workers from job security coverage and intensiied the pace of deunionisation in 
conjunction with the extensive ‘union-busting’ practices deployed by businesses (Çelik 2015: 623–
24, 628–32). Epitomising these tendencies, the government’s primary labour and employment poli-
cy, announced in 2012 under the title of ‘National Employment Strategy’, proved ineffective in of-
fering long-term solutions to the deteriorating conditions of an increasingly precarious workforce. 
As Sümercan Bozkurt (2013: 213) recounts, the Strategy 
has mainly been based upon measures of decreasing non-wage labour costs by means of reducing em-
ployer social security contributions, ensuring subsidies to employers for the employment of disadvan-
taged categories such as youth and women, introducing active labour market policy schemes and new 
lexible work contracts. 
he focus on lexible work and deregulated contractual obligations to limit social security has effec-
tively enabled greater surplus appropriation by employers and further undermined the living con-
ditions of the labouring masses at a time when wage inequality increased (Tansel et al. 2014) and a 
government report noted that 72 per cent of the households in Turkey had a monthly income of TL 
1,200 or less—which puts them well below the poverty line of TL 3,136 as identiied by the Confed-
eration of Progressive Trade Unions in 2011 (Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı 2011: 171, Bianet 
2011). 
 he National Employment Strategy’s lexible work emphasis should be read in conjunction with 
the fact that ‘nearly half of the working population are still not covered by any (…) insurance 
schemes, working entirely informally in the labor market’ (Eder 2010: 157). hese changes have not 
only affected the economic prospects of workers, but also had a direct corporeal impact due to the 
deteriorations in safe working conditions, which have resulted in serious workplace disasters at 
privatised former state enterprises like the Soma mine (Scott 2014). 2016 marked the highest death 
toll in the country’s modern history as 1,970 employees lost their lives at their workplaces (Bianet 
2017). he corollary of these drastic changes in employment patterns and regulations at a time of 
‘growth’ has not been ‘sizeable increases in (…) employment spreading all around the country’ (Çe-
lik 2016: 41), but an increased rate of proletarianisation in urban centres, a growing number of dis-
possessed peasants as well as a limited social security net for those at the lower ends of the income 
ladder (Köse and Bahçe 2009: 404, Eraydın 2011: 832). he overall deterioration of the respect for 
workers’ rights has also placed the country in the International Trade Union Confederation’s list of 
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the ten worst countries for workers, along with Algeria, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Colombia, Egypt, 
Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia and the Philippines (ITUC 2018). 
 he limits of the government’s growth model further manifest in its inability to tackle inequali-
ty. While there were short-term improvements in income distribution, particularly in 2005–2007, 
income inequality has risen considerably since 2007, with the Gini coefficient increasing from 38.4 
in 2007 to 42.9 in 2015, the highest level in 14 years (Figure 7).  In 2016, the coefficient stood at 20
41.9, still ahead of its 2002 level of 41.4. 2007 also marked the beginning of a period of recuperation 
for top income earners and the decrease in the share of top one per cent registered in the 2003–
2007 period has since been reversed. he top one per cent share in national income reached 23.4 
per cent in 2016—surpassing its 2002 level of 22.4 per cent—while the bottom 50 per cent share has 
been steadily declining since 2013 (Figure 8).  21
<< Figures 7 and 8 >> 
 In the context of a stagnant labour market, rising income inequality and uneven income distri-
bution, how has the overall growth of the economy translated into the everyday lives of house-
holds? Reviewing the drastic changes in the patterns of savings and indebtedness reveals that 
households in Turkey have not enjoyed the spoils of a growing economy through increases in real 
wage income, but have ended up relying more on savings and credit to get by. Household savings 
declined sharply from 16.1 per cent in 2002 to 7.3 per cent in 2012, against the background of steep 
rises in household debt, which—fuelled by easier access to credit—‘reached 49 per cent of dispos-
able personal income in 2012, implying around a seven-fold increase since the end of 
2003’ (Karaçimen 2014: 174, 163). As Elif Karaçimen registers, ‘[a]s a proportion of Turkey’s gross 
domestic product (GDP), the total of consumer loans and credit card debt increased sharply from 
1.8 per cent in 2002 to 18.7 per cent in 2012’, which has disproportionately exposed lower income 
households to indebtedness as those who earn TL 2,000 or less constitute 68 per cent of all con-
sumer loan borrowers (Karaçimen, 2014: 163, 174). Accordingly, just as the hot money inlows and 
cheap foreign credit have engendered ‘speculative growth’ (Yeldan and Ünüvar 2016: 20) at the 
macroeconomic level, access to private credit has acted as a pressure valve which has temporarily 
relieved an emerging social reproduction crisis while simultaneously increasing household indebt-
edness and disciplining indebted workers (Kus 2016). 
Conclusion: Knowing the answer to the wrong question 
he snapshot of the Turkish economy I have offered in the second part of the paper raises impor-
tant questions about the assumptions and objectives of the analyses published in the ‘rising powers’ 
debate. Given the marked deteriorations in the everyday experiences of households I have outlined 
and the chequered balance sheet of the economy, why has the participants’ focus in this debate re-
mained on an oten misconstrued conception of growth? Why has this debate sidestepped tackling 
crucial questions on the transformation of the state under neoliberalism and the resultant changes 
in economic management and democratic practices? Why have those who exalted the ideology of 
growth ignored the fact that ‘there can be growth without social development (that is, quantitative 
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growth without qualitative development)’ as Henri Lefebvre (1996: 177) put it? hese concerns 
force us to acknowledge that attempting to answer whether Turkey is a ‘rising power’ in the terms 
exercised by the existing debate is a moot point. If one takes interpretive license from Ursula Le 
Guin’s he Let Hand of Darkness, the ‘rising powers’ debate on Turkey can be summarised as an 
endeavour that ‘exhibit[s] the perfect uselessness of knowing the answer to the wrong question’. 
 his critique naturally bears broader implications for the debate on the BRICS and ‘rising pow-
ers’. Ater all, many other ‘emerging countries’ that have been designated as the future ‘rising pow-
ers’, and BRICS members themselves can be subjected to a similar interrogation about what their 
growth policies have entailed in socio-economic, environmental and political terms. Nevertheless, 
within both the critical and more conventional quarters of the ‘rising powers’ literature (see Robin-
son 2015, Hameiri and Jones 2016), there is an awareness of the costs of growth and the antinomies 
of these countries’ economic trajectories that the participants of the debate on Turkey have failed to 
capture. In placing Turkey within an amorphous ‘rising powers’ framework—and, thus, overem-
phasising its socio-economic and political improvements—the debate also risks reproducing the 
government’s own discourse which attempts to downplay the grave problems that still plague the 
country on the basis of the existence of similar issues in other ‘emerging’, and, indeed, ‘developed’ 
countries. 
 he contention with the prioritisation of select macroeconomic indicators as indubitable prox-
ies for ‘development’ and ‘progress’ should not be read as a blanket dismissal of efforts to measure 
economic activity. Nor should the reader assume that the counter indicators I have selected to 
problematise the analytical focus of the ‘rising powers’ debate on Turkey (e.g., unemployment rate) 
automatically represent more ‘accurate’ or less questionable metrics. What the paper has demon-
strated is that, even if conventional macroeconomic indicators are accepted and deployed without 
any objection, the debate on Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status fails to adequately analyse the determi-
nants and social consequences of the country’s ‘growth’ years. Underpinned by a conception of de-
velopment that excessively valorises growth, the debate has drastically limited the scope of what is 
considered important in examining the country’s economic and political performance, and—re-
gardless of its participants’ intentions—legitimised neoliberalism. Ultimately, the portrayal of the 
Turkish economy in this debate conveniently overlapped with a hegemonic discourse coalesced 
around the ‘success’ of the government’s economic programme. 
 he challenge this paper raises for the participants in this debate, as well as to those who would 
like to identify the next breed of ‘rising powers’ in the global economy, is to relect on the ramiica-
tions of utilising certain macroeconomic indicators, and to consider whether it is worth reorienting 
the terms of the debate in line with the concrete experiences of those who live and struggle in the 
economies of ‘growth’. 
Notes 
 See Becker (2013), McNally (2012), Nölke et al. (2014), Stephen (2014), Kiely (2015), Gray and Murphy 1
(2015).
 N-11 includes Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, 2
South Korea and Vietnam.
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  hese snapshots represent a fragment of the burgeoning literature on Turkey’s ‘rising power’ status. In 3
addition to the publications discussed throughout the article, readers can refer to the following texts for 
other interventions that operate within the parameters of the ‘rising powers’ debate: Cornell, Knaus and 
Scheich (2012), Bank and Karadag (2013), Tanrısever (2015), Şatana (2016), Boyle (2016), Pehlivantürk 
(2017).
 It is beyond the scope of the paper to delve into a substantial discussion of the limitations and pitfalls of 4
the GDP measurements, particularly as an indicator of social welfare and economic progress. For exami-
nations of and alternatives to GDP, see, inter alia, Seers (1972), Mishan (1975[1967]), Sen (1991), Vellinga 
and Withagen (1996), Stockhammer et al. (1997), Gough, McGregor and Camield (2007), Stiglitz, Sen 
and Fitoussi (2009), Fioramonti (2013), Coyle (2014), Mügge (2016).
 Without assuming a linear trajectory of progress, I use the term ‘development’ here to refer, broadly, to the 5
processes of socio-economic change, and ‘neoliberal development’ as a shorthand for capturing those pro-
cesses that prioritise capital accumulation. As such, the term ‘neoliberal development’ should not be read 
exclusively as a reference to its incarnation in development studies, which is oten used to describe a con-
stellation of (neoliberal) policy prescriptions advocated by international organisations and inancial insti-
tutions to be implemented in the global South. For the latter, see Kyung-Sup, Fine and Weiss (2012), Esco-
bar (2012[1995]), Weber (2015), Bishop (2016: 13–17).
 On China, see Lim (2017); on Russia, see Rutland (2012).6
 See Berlinski (2017) for a retrospective.7
  For glimpses into the once-thriving debate on the limits and prospects of promoting a ‘Turkish model’, see 8
Çağaptay (2014), Taşpınar (2014), Tuğal (2016).
 Şaban Kardaş (2013) provides the only contribution that attempts to construct a framework of analysis, 9
but his own conceptualisation is irmly wedded to the concept of ‘regional’—not ‘rising’—power, which 
leads him to circumnavigate some of the key aspects of the ‘rising powers’ debate that the editors and other 
authors focus on, while reinscribing the centrality of ‘hard power’ capabilities in determining what consti-
tutes a ‘regional power’.
 For representative examples, see Oğuzlu and Parlar Dal (2013: 618), Çağaptay (2013: 808).10
  he extent to which the concept of ‘rising powers’—or at least its incarnation as a category with which to 11
assess Turkey’s post-2002 trajectory—remains undertheorised can be detected in the prognoses offered by 
the contributors. Despite the efforts to place Turkey next to China and Russia as a ‘rising power’, at least in 
two pieces the authors put forward ‘[t]he deepening of Turkish democracy through a series of 
reform’ (Oğuzlu and Parlar Dal 2013: 634) and ‘sustaining and deepening the principles of liberal democ-
racy’ (Çağaptay 2013: 807) as preconditions for Turkey’s aim to ‘become a complete rising power’ (Oğuzlu 
and Parlar Dal 2013: 634). he obvious question that remains unanswered is whether the existing ‘com-
plete’ rising powers like China and Russia have successfully ‘deepened’ their democracies or adopted the 
principles of liberal democracy.
  See Öniş and Güven (2011), Öniş and Kutlay (2013) for two exceptions.12
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 Unless otherwise noted, all data are retrieved from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Avail13 -
able from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator [accessed 10 July 2018]. Turkish Statistical Institute recently 
revised the country’s GDP series in line with the System of National Accounts (SNA-2008) and the Eu-
ropean System of Accounts (ESA-2010), which resulted in a signiicant increase in the estimated real GDP 
growth rate from 2009 onwards. While the new series seem to have captured the role of construction sec-
tor investments more accurately (Bakış 2016), as Erik Meyersson (2016) has demonstrated, statistical revi-
sions have created an ‘unprecedented upward revision in Turkey’s economic performance’, ‘not only from 
an absolute perspective, but especially so in comparison with other cases of ESA (European standards) or 
SNA (United Nations standards) revisions’. Seen together with AKP governments’ tendency to ‘revise’ 
macroeconomic igures and the widespread criticisms of the ways in which official statistics are collected 
and interpreted, there are good reasons to approach the new growth rates with a healthy scepticism. For 
this reason, instead of the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook igures which are based on these revi-
sions, I opted to use the previous set of igures available from the World Bank database. For other critical 
assessments of the new growth igures, see Boratav (2017), Sönmez (2017).
 I selected the FTSE classiication here as it brings together the BRICS with many of the high performers in 14
other ‘emerging market’ groupings like N-11 and MINT. ‘FTSE Annual Country Classiication Review’, 
FTSE Russell, 1 September 2016. Available from: http://www.tse.com/products/downloads/FTSE-Coun-
try-Classiication-Update_latest.pdf [accessed 10 July 2018].
 See, for example, Öniş and Kutlay (2013: 1412) even though the authors note that they measure growth in 15
nominal terms.
 As Dani Rodrik (2015) put it, ‘[t]he comparative experience suggests that Turkey (and other similar coun16 -
tries) beneited from an unusually favorable external environment. In particular, inancial globalization 
and the availability of cheap foreign capital seems to have played a critical role’ in these countries’ recent 
economic performance.
 Data retrieved from the Prime Ministry Privatisation Administration’s 2016 annual report, cited in the text 17
as ÖİB (2017). Online copy available from: http://www.oib.gov.tr/dokuman/faaliyet-raporlari/2016-yili-
faaliyet-raporu.pdf [accessed 10 July 2018].
 Data retrieved from the World Bank Privatisation Database. Available from: http://data.worldbank.org/18
data-catalog/privatization-database [accessed 10 July 2018].
  Data retrieved from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Unemployment rates are modelled 19
ILO estimates.
  Data retrieved from the World Bank World Development Indicators.20
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